We examine solutions in which neither player is worse off from the leadership of one in a policy maker-public game. The loop model of dynamic games is used. Outcome space is dotted with equivalence classes of solutions. The Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) results and their New Keynesian variants might represent one category. The economy is the neighborhood of a market-clearing equilibrium with Pareto-optimal properties modulo frictions. Our interest lies in the 'old' Keynesian genus where the representative state is one of involuntary unemployment. Two information sets are relevant. In the first case, agents look to the past and the present. In the second, they are bound by the information provided in the present. The standard analysis pertains to DSGE models under full information. We show, in contrast, that in a situation of structural disequilibrium and feedback information, all parties are better off reneging on the social compact to achieve a superior class of solutions.
Introduction
The limitations of the mainstream dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model have been advertised in recent times because of its inability to model financial-real breakdowns. Our systems appraisal below rests on the following assumptions. While the foundations of the DSGE model are often proclaimed to be Walrasian, scholars have questioned this claim (Kirman, 2010) . The dynamical equation of Definition 1 is intended to capture the idea that a plethora of disequilibrium adjustment mechanisms may be available. Trade takes place sequentially. At each stage, the state of the world is available for observation. The economy, in turn, is the outcome of the actions of agents. Put differently, agents act in a social context. As the context changes, preferences may be influenced. Secondly, the fundamental notion of 'representation of strategies along trajectories' below is another way of expressing 'model uncertainty' (Dow et. al., 2009) . No single model can capture the feedback between individual and system and policy. In a situation of uncertainty as distinct from risk, the probability distributions of shocks remain unknown. Without a given model, the disturbance terms cannot be expressed formally. The assumption of rational expectations does not help as there is no benchmark model to anchor expectations.
Preliminaries
A corollary to DSGE theorems is the inefficiency role played by the authorities. The government, in the form of the central bank, is the leader and firms and workers are followers in the macroeconomic game. The following account is drawn from Başar and Jan Olsder (1995) . Hierarchical or Stackelberg equilibria are an important component of the loop model of dynamic games. There are two possibilities. In the prior commitment mode of play decisions are made at the outset. Feedback games, on the other hand, are of the delayed commitment type. Each player waits to find out the current value of the state and only then announces her action.
Time inconsistency emerges in prior commitment decisions. In the absence of formal or informal precepts, in every period there is an incentive for the leader to renege on her commitment. In the macroeconomic illustrations the payoffs to the government by 'cheating' thereby increase and the payoffs to the private sector fall, both being calculated in relation to the (Nash) payoffs that would obtain in a situation where the players were symmetrically positioned. The prior commitment strategy is nonconcurrent. Since the inconsistency arises because of the information that is forthcoming in every period, the recommended solution to the problem is to employ open-loop strategies, that is, strategies that depend only on the initial state and time. In terms of the debate in macroeconomics, the case is made for rules as against discretion. Our understanding of leadership in the policy game is the opposite (Fischbocher, 2010) . The leader is not an outsider. Leading by example she induces others to follow suit and act in the collective interest. Furthermore, typically her discount rate would need to be different from those of the followers. For instance, she might need to be more patient and even need to have other-regarding preferences.
In the agent-based computational view, the acquisition and use of information are central concepts (Tubaro, 2009) . Induction scores over deduction. The loop model of dynamic games utilizes a finer classification of information structures than that which informs the discussion in economics. It will be shown that under dynamic information, both the followers as well as the leader are not worse off playing the Stackelberg game than the associated Nash game. In addition, subsets of dynamic information patterns will be identified wherein the Feedback Stackelberg Solution is 1. time-inconsistent and 2. both time-consistent and optimal. A function 
i which are the permissible strategies of Pi at stage k.
} is a strategy for Pi in the game and the class Γ i of all such 
The information structures of relevance are as follows:
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Definition 2. Pi's information structure is said to be
The Noncooperative (Nash) Equilibrium Solution is given by 
In the next section we restrict our attention to feedback games where at the time of her act each player has perfect information concerning the current level of play. In that case, the set of inequalities above is rewritten as 
On any pair of Nash equilibrium strategies that satisfies the above inequalities, impose the further restriction that it satisfies the following K inequalities: For the purpose of the Stackelberg Equilibrium Solution, the following definitions will be required where P1 is the leader and P2 the follower.
Definition 5. The set
is the rational reaction set of P2 to the strategy γ 1 ∈ Γ 1 of P1.
Remark 1. If the rational reaction set of the follower is a singleton for every announced strategy of the leader, then there exists a mapping
In words, the optimal response of the follower is unique for every strategy of the leader. The property of the rational reaction set is sufficient to ensure that the leader never does worse in the "Stackelberg game" than in the associated "Nash game". Economists are unaware of this restriction of the definition.
Definition 6. A strategy γ 1 * ∈ Γ 1 is called a Stackelberg equilibrium strategy for the leader if
Let the above quantity be denoted by There is no basis at k for cheating at future stages only if the past actions are consistent with the original solution.
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The Results

A fundamental role is played in the theory
The subset of Γ thus constructed constitutes an equivalence class of representations all of which have the same open-loop value. If this procedure is carried out for every element of Γ G the construction of all equivalence classes of Γ can be completed.
The following result (Başar and Olsder, 1995) which pertains to the information patterns of Definition 2 has been proved in Correa (1999) .
Proposition 1. Under dynamic information, the Stackelberg solution is also a Nash equilibrium solution.
In economics, the problem is posed as a choice between optimality and time-consistency. Bellman's principle of optimality leads to time-consistent solutions. However, in models in which expectations are forward-looking, the timeconsistent solutions are suboptimal. The dynamic programming solution yields a higher cost than the ex ante, timeinconsistent optimal solution. In terms of the present discussion it can be clarified that the information pattern implicitly assumed is the MPS or the FB pattern. The sub optimality of the time-consistent policy arises because no account is taken of the effect of the control sequence after the first period. In other words,
Proposition 2. Under the MPS and FB information structures, the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium solution is time-inconsistent.
Proof. Suppose the players were operating under the FB information pattern. The identical argument carries over to the MPS information structure. At stage k, P1, say, decides to recommit. By virtue of the definition, it must be the case that both parties have reneged on an equilibrium path earlier. Her inducement to do so must be
where Under the CLPS and MPS information patterns, on the other hand, the discussion can be summarized in the following statement.
Proposition 3. Under the OL and CLPS information structures, the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium solution is both time-consistent and optimal.
Proof. Consider a FSE γ 1* ,γ 2* { } . At stage k, P1, the leader, decides to renege on this solution. As earlier, it must be the case that for some strategy ˜ γ k 1 ,
The defection under CLPS or MPS implies entry into an information equivalence class where
Accordingly, the evolution of the state till stage k is given bỹ
It turns out, therefore, that for agent P1, the leader, either
If the first inequality holds, the assumption that the solution was a game-equilibrium is violated. If the second inequality is valid, the inducement to deviate from the Nash or Stackelberg solution evaporates. Analogous reasoning holds for the other player (the follower). In other words, for all
The FNE or FSE solution is both optimal and time-consistent.
The notion of optimality used in the results is entirely information-specific and different from the concept in Economics according to which the notion is information-invariant. A definition that would be recognized by an economist is as follows:
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Conclusion
The postulate of rational expectations is that agents use all information generated by the model. Our results, however, hinge on the assumptions concerning the choice of information sets. If the economy is in a general equilibrium with nice properties, rational expectations delivers the familiar result that neither the government nor the private sector is better off reneging on the social equilibrium. If, on the other hand, the economy is in an unemployment equilibrium and agents suffer from, say, imperfect recall, both parties are better off 'cheating' on the solution and moving to a dominating solution set. The fundamental construct here is that outcome space consists of classes of solutions.
